最近Citadel创始人Ken Griffin的一个访谈：

市场与经济展望

市场对特朗普政府的亲增长政策充满热情，包括再工业化、对美国工人的支持，以及在接近充分就业的情况下实施的财政/货币刺激措施，这在经济中制造了“sugar high”。

关税尚未完全计入价格；市场对关税、移民限制、财政政策和宽松货币政策可能带来的通胀过于自满。

通胀高于目标，可能在2026年重新加速；迹象包括美元贬值（2025年上半年10%）、黄金创纪录高位，以及加密货币等资产通胀。

美联储关注劳动力市场而非通胀的风险很高；格里芬将其与珍妮特·耶伦后衰退时期的鸽派方法对比，但质疑其当前适用性。

政府关门反映了两党财政不负责任；美国在周期后期运行6-7%的赤字，远非克林顿时代盈余。

债务担忧是资产管理者首要问题；出路包括通过放松管制实现增长，但也需要税收/支出改革，以避免未来财富税或高税率（60-80%）。

特朗普政府政策

优点：放松管制释放“动物精神”和创业精神；政府与商业联系紧密，与拜登政府不同。 缺点：关税伤害中小型企业、农民和全球竞争力；

历史显示关税导致国内退缩。

移民：支持关闭边境，但主张为贡献者提供公民路径（例如农业、建筑）；推动STEM绿卡并吸引全球人才（例如硅谷50%的初创企业由移民创立）。

美联储独立性：至关重要，以允许不受欢迎的决定如加息；政治化将风险失控通胀，伤害弱势群体如退休人员。

对政府的建议：需要更好的经济顾问；一党控制提供两年窗口，在经济、移民、教育和文化方面实现积极变革。

地缘政治与全球碎片化

希望美中缓和，以建立稳定的互动规则。

世界正在碎片化；中国主导非洲/南美/亚洲的基础设施，侵蚀美影响力（例如发电厂、机场、网络）。

关税加速碎片化，减少美国全球投射；与过去的美国公司如通用电气对比。

对人才流失的担忧：例如中国DeepSeek AI未经美国教育人才开发，预示长期可怕后果。

人工智能、技术与投资

AI炒作类似于互联网泡沫：变革性但可能需要20-30年，而非3-5年；

预计赢家/输家洗牌（例如Lotus 1-2-3 vs. Excel）。

代币化：持怀疑态度；欺诈机会（“骗子”），而非降低成本；美国市场已高效，低/无费用。

市场忽略风险；牛市FOMO忽略潜在快速修正的风险（例如1987年崩盘无催化剂）。

Citadel与业务增长

Citadel Securities：扩展至美国抵押支持证券、亚洲政府债券；在Jim Esposito领导下以客户为中心。 预测市场：如果增长持续，将提供流动性，鉴于零售重点。 IPO考虑：由CEO Peng Zhao决定；负担包括诉讼/代理权斗争，而非季度报告。 并购/IPO：受政策不确定性（如关税）放缓；需要稳定性以加速。 私人信贷：过去十年增长故事，帮助私募股权提供执行确定性，但缺乏市值反馈，风险资本分配不当和绩效难以判断。

其中关于私募债

private credit is really fascinating. Our growth story over the last decade in the alternative space, and it has some real some really important strengths and in particular, private credit has been incredibly helpful to the LBO firms, the private equity firms, because it gives them certainty of execution for the deals they're trying to get done. You know, 20 years ago. 30 years. Gosh, I'm really aging myself. 30 years ago, that would have been 35 years ago. The the letter from Drexel. We are highly confident we can raise the money. Right. And Michael Milken literally changed the world of finance with those letters. He changed the entire U.S. economy.

But jump forward 35 years to the day of Drexel. The private credit community is now able to tell. A private equity firm view can definitively consummate this transaction because we're good for it. The challenge with private credit is you lose the mark to market feedback loop that you have in public market securities. So I worry about two two factors that come from that. Number one is. Are the people who are underwriting those credits, receiving really good feedback about the quality of their investment decision making process, because that's how they learn and grow. You know, very few companies actually ever default. So that mark to market journey is a really important indicator to the quality of your investment decision making as an investor. And they're losing that. That's gone. And with so much money being deployed in the private credit markets, that worries me about how thoughtfully we allocate capital as a society.

That's number one. Number two, for retail institutional investors, it's very hard to judge a private credit credit money manager. Because the assets aren't marked daily, weekly or monthly in a meaningful, stringent way. It's really hard to differentiate the quality of performance between different firms and being an investor in privately myself, I will tell you it's remarkable. You know, I've seen term sheets for a given deal. The the fact that every single private credit firm delivers almost exactly the same term sheet. It's really quite profound. I mean, what what real distinction underwriting is happening when you've got seven people all bidding on a deal and they're all within 25 basis points of one another. I mean, that to me is shocking.

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